United Arab Emirates

About the Doha Amendment

Parties to the Kyoto Protocol adopted an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol by decision 1/CMP.8 in accordance with Articles 20 and 21 of the Kyoto Protocol, at the eighth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol held in Doha, Qatar, in December 2012.

On 21 December 2012, the amendment was circulated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations acting in his capacity as Depositary to all Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in accordance with Articles 20 and 21 of the Protocol. The Depositary notification can be found here.

Pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 7 and Article 20, paragraph 4, the amendment is subject to acceptance by Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. In accordance with Article 20, paragraph 4, the amendment will enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day after the date of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at least three fourths of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.

In paragraph 5 of decision 1/CMP.8, the CMP recognized that Parties may provisionally apply the amendment pending its entry into force in accordance with Articles 20 and 21 of the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties intending to provisionally apply the amendment pending its entry into force may provide notification to the Depositary of their intention to provisionally apply the amendment.

The list below sets out the latest information concerning acceptances received by the Depositary, as well as information on notifications of provisional application.

Minister Balakrishnan shared Singapore’s initiatives in energy conservation, fuel efficiency, green buildings, traffic management and research and development of clean environment technologies.

The focus of the dialogue was on the following questions:

1. How can we shape an ambitious, effective and fair climate agreementwith active participation from all countries by 2015, and implement it from 2020?
2. How can the UN climate process bring about more climate action at national level up to 2020, so that we can remain below the 2°C ceiling?
3. How can international climate policy create effective incentives for more private investment to advance the transformation towards a low-emission economy?
4. How can the climate change conference in Warsaw help us to achieve our main goals, and what are the most important milestones on the path to a new agreement in 2015?

Discussing these questions is intended to generate political momentum for international climate policy, which can then be translated into concrete progress in the UN negotiations this year.

The dialogue strives to achieve the following results:

• Potential elements of a new international climate agreement and different options for the type and structure of the agreement will be debated. There are already indications that different players have different ideas regarding the shape and role of a new climate agreement. A discussion at an early stage in the process will enhance understanding of the different options and their consequences, and will facilitate consensus.
• Important milestones are to be identified for the period up to 2015. These should cover the negotiations on a post-2020 agreement and the implementation and strengthening of national climate action with the goal of limiting global warming to a maximum of 2°C.
• Effective strategies are to be presented on how support and commitment by the general public can be ensured, in particular at national level. In this context, it will be important to explore how governments can give incentives to various stakeholders (e.g. the private sector or civil society) to back political decisions for more climate action and to make a greater contribution to the fight against climate change themselves.

Federal Environment Minister Altmaier and Polish Environment Minister Korolec will compile a political summary of the meeting (“co-chairs’ summary”) so that the results can feed directly into the UN negotiations. Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel will open the conference.

Context and background

The Petersberg Climate Dialogue – complementing the negotiations since 2010

Initiative:

Federal Chancellor Merkel initiated the Petersberg Climate Dialogue after theUN climate summit in Copenhagen in December 2009. Germany has a long tradition (UN climate change conference in Berlin in 1995, EU and G8Presidency in 2007) as a political pioneer in international climate policy. Today, Germany shows with its Energiewende project how important it is to take concrete steps at the national level to implement the economic transformation towards a low-carbon future, thus being in a better position to fulfil international obligations. This approach can be a model for others.

Purpose:

The purpose of the dialogue is to advance international climate action at several levels:

1. UN climate negotiations: Scheduled in the middle of the year, the dialogue gives ministers the opportunity for political reflection on the decisions taken at past UN conferences and for an open discussion on the desired outcome of the next UN conference(s). The Petersberg Climate Dialogue meetings in the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 made it clear that ambitious climate policy must remain among the priorities of the international community.
2. National climate policy of participating countries: The dialogue will also build a bridge between “implementation and negotiation”. It provides a platform for an exchange on the challenges countries face in the implementation and planning of national climate measures. The International Partnership on Mitigation and MRV (measurement, reporting and verification, www.mitigationpartnership.net ) promotes international networking and practical exchange. The dialogue also helps players to use experience gained in the implementation of climate action for the UNclimate negotiations.

Status:

The initiative to establish the Petersberg Climate Dialogue originated in Germany. The meetings are co-chaired by Germany and the upcoming Presidency of the UN climate negotiations (Mexico in 2010, South Africa in 2011, Qatar in 2012 and Poland this year). Participants come from all regions of the world and all negotiating groups. Discussions are held in an informal style to facilitate an open and honest debate. Similar to the meetings in 2010, 2011 and 2012, Germany and its co-host have invited about 35 countries to this year’s conference. The diverse and representative character of the dialogue sends an important signal: all countries together should shoulder the responsibility for effective climate action and demonstrate joint leadership in the international arena.

Together, Canada, Japan and Russia account for 29.2 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions but the three countries had indicated they did not want to be obligated under the Kyoto Protocol beyond its first commitment period, which ended 31 December 2012. For Kyoto supporters, this is a symbolic blow and badly damages the UN climate process already weakened by divisions. But more importantly, what does this mean for Asia?

The move deals a major blow to the Convention on climate change, following the wrap-up of the most recent Doha climate talks and particularly when science is telling us that this is not the time for incremental action. To address the urgency of climate change, the process of negotiations has been targeting for a series of paramount decisions to emerge from the 2015 climate change talks, in hopes of ushering in a new era of response measures. The aim is to see a new protocol that will supersede the Kyoto Protocol by 2020. 

Not surprisingly, the exit of major emitters is cause for concern. Their emission figures are stark –Canada accounts for 690 million metric tons CO₂ equivalent (MT CO₂ eq), Japan 1.122 billion metric tons CO₂ eq, and Russia 2.192 billion metric tonnes of CO₂ eq. Together, the trio account for around 11 percent of global emissions.

To avoid locking in an irreversible path to climate change and its potentially devastating effects, there is need to reform the global economy to a low-carbon footing. The recent Doha talks remind us all that multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol which sets binding obligations for 37 industrialised nations, can be a long-drawn and complicated process of achieving that low-carbon footing. 

Furthermore, the future of the Kyoto Protocol–and indeed the entire climate regime–is on the line as big emitters formally withdraw their participation, putting the world at peril. 

Under the Copenhagen Accord, Canada was committed to reducing its GHG emissions to a level 17 percent below the 2005 level by year 2020. However, on 13 December 2011, Canada formally withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol.  

Japan, the world’s fifth-biggest emitter, is overhauling its energy policies after the Fukushima crisis dampened public confidence in nuclear power, with safety fears preventing a restart of reactors that had been shut for maintenance checks. Imports of oil and gas have soared as a result. Prior to the 11 March triple disaster, Japan had pledged to reduce emissions by 25 percent below 1990 levels come 2020, on condition that other industrialised countries made similar pledges. Following the Fukushima fallout, Japan’s emissions have steadily increased due to the burning of fossil fuels. It is estimated that just two of Japan’s 54 reactors are online, a sharp reduction for an industry that once supplied 30 percent of the country’s electricity.

Not unexpectedly, on 10 December 2010, the Japanese indicated that they did not intend to be under the obligation of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol after 2012. 

Russia, the world’s third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases behind China and the US also announced a year ago that it did not intend to assume the quantitative emissions limitation or reduction commitment (QELRC) that binds Annex I countries, for the second commitment period.

The main source of structural power for Russia in the climate negotiations is its status as a large economy that is rich in fossil fuels. It is one of the major emitters of GHGs (5.4 percent of the world’s total), and an important player in oil and gas markets with a 5.8 percent share of the world’s proven oil reserves and nearly a 24 percent share in the global gas reserves.

Russia’s support for climate cooperation was contingent on participation by the US, China, and other major economies. Thus, at the Doha talks, Russia had quickly sided with Japan, Canada, and the US in rejecting a second commitment period.

Pulling out of Kyoto now also allows countries to avoid penalties for missing targets. This means financial contributions will be reduced. Canada currently foots 3.2 percent of the total bill, with Japan at 12.53 percent and Russia at 1.6 percent. Canada is likely to save up to C$14 billion (S$17.64 billion) going forward.

While monetary contributions may not set the UN Secretariat back by much, the formal withdrawal of these countries may spark other industrialised nations to follow suit. The result would be detrimental to the climate change progress made since 1992. 

The pulling out of major emitters means the UNFCCC will look to Asia’s largest emitters–China and India–to play an increasingly significant role in determining the success of the multilateral climate change regime. This is not only likely, but also a necessary option seeing that climate change will affect developing countries disproportionately more than rich ones. Tropical and subtropical lands are more sensitive to warming than cold or temperate countries, while rich countries can afford better flood controls and drought-resistant seeds than poor economies.

China has already overtaken the US as the world’s largest CO2 emitter. India is posed to overtake Russia as the third-largest emitter in the near future. Given their huge populations, which jointly cover almost two-fifth of the world population, it is hardly surprising the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that China and India will account for 45 percent of global energy demand growth by 2030.

The IEA also predicts that the two countries will be responsible for 80 percent of the increase in coal demand–China and India already produce a combined total of around 29 percent of the world’s emissions, and apart from Japan, are the only two Asian countries in the top 10 largest emitters of carbon dioxide globally.

That said, success at climate negotiations will not be forthcoming unless the key concerns of these Asian countries–particularly challenges pertaining to inequities–are sufficiently taken into account in the future development of climate change.

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres looks ahead at what governments will be trying to achieve at the April 2013 Climate Change Conference in Bonn as they progress towards a universal climate agreement in 2015.

The Durban Platform process: sharpening the focus in 2013

In Doha, Parties agreed on major milestones for 2013-2015, including: to consider elements for a draft negotiating text by COP 20 and prepare a negotiating text before May 2015; and to identify, in 2013, options for actions to close the pre-2020 ambition gap. To advance the negotiations, Parties further agreed in Doha to focus their work in 2013 (please see the report of the ADP.
As we have outlined in our informal note on the upcoming second session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP 2), Parties are expected to shift gears this year to take the work to the next stage. In this article, we consider the process under the current two ADP workstreams – to deliver the 2015 agreement and to enhance current efforts and bridge the “ambition gap” – and how the upcoming session of the ADP can contribute to move its work to the next stage.

ADP on the road to COP 21

The ADP does not need to reinvent the wheel for the road ahead to 2015. Work is not starting from scratch. Governments should seek to build upon their achievements to date, ensure coherence, and maximize synergies. In order to keep Parties informed about relevant developments, we intend to hold regular briefings by the Chairs of SBSTA and SBI on ADP-related issues from the April session onwards.

Furthermore, climate change is being discussed in all countries and at all levels. The ADP could therefore benefit from involvement of Ministers and Heads of State and Government. Recognizing the need for high-level engagement, the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon announced in Doha his intention to convene world leaders in 2014 to rally support for the 2015 agreement. Involvement of stakeholders is also very important to the ADP process. Stakeholders from various constituencies are strongly involved in efforts to combat climate change, and could contribute much in terms of knowledge, preparedness and resources.

Parties should begin to focus on the 2015 agreement, and keep broad aims in mind as we move forward. The agreement will be under the Convention and in the context of global political, social and economic change, as well as of existing policy frameworks. We therefore urge Parties to consider not just its scope, structure and design, but how the agreement fits into a bigger picture – what would be captured in the agreement, and how it could add value to current and future international and national action on climate change. We have therefore sought to design the upcoming session in a manner which allows Parties to start to focus on the outcome in 2015.

The second session of the ADP

The second session of the ADP will be held 29 April to 3 May at the World Conference Center in Bonn, Germany. Governments will need to focus on elements of the 2015 agreement and take a practical and results-orientated approach to identifying actions and initiatives to accelerate near-term action. It would also be useful to take a longer-term view on the process and consider what would be needed by the end of 2013 to keep the ADP on track under both workstreams.

In April, as announced in our informal note, we will advance the work in workshops and round tables. In keeping with the request by Parties in Doha, the note suggests focused questions to facilitate the workshop and round table discussions (see annex to the informal note.)

Workstream 1: 2015 agreement

For workstream 1, ADP established modalities of work, developed a plan of work, and began to clarify key issues and concerns that will need to be addressed to reach agreement by 2015. Parties are expected to deepen their exchange on the overall vision for the 2015 agreement, on the possible contours and architecture of the 2015 agreement, on how the principles of the Convention will be applied, commitments will be defined, and differing national circumstances will be taken into account. It is important to begin to identify the elements of the broader package surrounding the 2015 agreement that will ensure it is acceptable to all and can be implemented from 2020. This year, Parties will move from a conceptual phase to a content-forming phase in preparation for a “text-forming” stage in 2014.

In this workstream, we have made arrangements for a workshop on scope, structure and design of the 2015 agreement. This will be followed by round tables which would seek to advance and refine issues raised by the workshop with respect to specific subject areas, namely mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation, and transparency of actions and support.

Workstream 2: pre-2020 ambition

In 2012, Parties identified specific initiatives that could increase ambition; explored the role of means of implementation; and proposed further work to analyze mitigation benefits of the initiatives. Many emphasized that the workstreams should be separate but mutually supportive, and that adaptation is an important aspect of ambition.

In 2013, we received many proposals on how mitigation ambition could be enhanced, including increasing ambition of existing pledges and new pledges. Many stress the importance of adequate support. The proposals also call for recognizing supplementary actions and other initiatives, such as: renewable energy and energy efficiency; action by ICAO and IMO; reduction of fossil fuel subsidies; and addressing short-lived climate pollutants and HFCs. Many proposals highlight the importance of working with stakeholders, and the need to create opportunities to reduce the costs of mitigation.

In this workstream, we have made arrangements for two workshops on: low-emission development opportunities and opportunities for mitigation and adaptation related to land use. In addition, round table discussions will be held on catalyzing action and on building a practical and results-oriented approach to increasing pre-2020 ambition.

We believe that the format and issues under discussion at the upcoming session will allow Parties to focus their discussions and advance the negotiations. We remain committed to engaging with both Parties and stakeholders as we move ahead in advancing the Durban Platform.